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Résumé  
 
Ce papier évalue l’influence de la politique budgétaire sur l’investissement résidentiel en France. En 
effet, l’investissement résidentiel est une variable clé lorsque l’on veut stabiliser le cycle économique. 
L’analyse  a  été  conduite  en  utilisant  la  méthodologie  d’un  VECM  afin  de  prendre  en  compte 
l’existence d’endogénéité et les co-mouvements entre les séries économiques. Les relations de long-
terme obtenues montrent que l’investissement résidentiel dépend du revenu permanent et des variables 
budgétaires,  en  particulier  les  subventions.  A  travers  une  approche  désagrégée  de  la  politique 
budgétaire, c’est-à-dire en différentiant les instruments budgétaires, l’étude montre que les avantages 
fiscaux et les avantages de taux d’intérêt sont les éléments budgétaires les plus efficaces lorsque l’on 
veut influencer l’investissement résidentiel. Il est à noter que l’introduction de facteurs financiers dans 
l’analyse,  tels  que  la  capacité  d’endettement,  indique  que  ces  derniers  ont  un  impact  positif  sur 
l’investissement  résidentiel  et  confirme  que  les  subventions  ont  un  effet  significatif  sur 
l’investissement. Par conséquent, nos résultats suggèrent que la politique budgétaire peut utiliser les 
subventions à l’investissement résidentiel pour une meilleure stabilisation du cycle économique. 
 
Mots clés:   Politique budgétaire, investissement résidentiel, VECM 
 





The present paper assesses the impact of fiscal policy on residential investment in France. The analysis 
is conducted in the framework of a VECM, since this allows accounting for endogeneity between the 
variables. Our results imply that a long term relationship between investment and subsidies exists, 
making subsidies an adequate measure to influence residential investment and hence the business 
cycle.  In  addition,  a  disaggregated  approach  taking  into  account  several  different  types  of  fiscal 
measures highlights that tax and interest rate subsidies are the most efficient fiscal tool for influencing 
residential investment.  When  accounting  for financial  factors  by  means  of  households'  borrowing 
capacity,  we  find  that  the  latter  also  impacts  residential  investment  positively.  Moreover,  this 
alternative  specification  underlines  the  robustness  of  the  above  mentioned  results,  as  it  confirms 
subsidies as the most efficient measure to influence residential investment. 
 
Key words:  Fiscal policy, residential investment, VECM 
 
JEL Code:   E62, R21, C22 
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1.  Introduction 
  
Recent  evolutions  on  European  housing  markets  have  been  marked  by  an  important  degree  of 
volatility and several studies have attempted to explain these movements by the emergence of bubbles 
(Ball, 2005; Norris and Shiels, 2007; Bessonne and al, 2005). Whatever the reasons (fundamentals vs. 
bubbles) behind these developments, the role of housing markets in the economic cycles of advanced 
economies has been well established (IMF 2008; Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008). Developments in 
real housing prices have been correlated with the business cycle; residential investment has driven the 
business cycle in several countries and seems to be a good predictor of economic recessions. In the 
US, Leamer (2008) has shown for instance that residential investment accounted for 10 percent of the 
weakness in GDP growth a year before a recession. Moreover, some authors point out that residential 
investment not only leads the cycle, but that it actually has become a destabilising factor in most 
advanced economies due to the volatility it induces (Davis and Heathcote, 2005; Ball and Wood, 
1999)1. Consequently, residential investment is a key variable to control when the aim is to stabilise 
the business cycle. 
     
The  aforementioned  issues  explain  easily  the  attention  that  has  been  paid  to  the  evolutions  of 
residential  investment.  Several  studies  have  identified  macroeconomic  variables  influencing 
residential investment such as household income and housing prices (Henderson and Ioannides, 1983; 
Lin and Lin, 1999; Arrondel and Lefebfre, 2001). Other studies have analysed the impact of mortgage 
market structures on investment and consumption spending (Campbell and Hercowitz, 2005). 
 
Although it seems very plausible that structural fiscal factors may contribute to determine residential 
investment (ECB, 2003), studies in that domain are scarce. Among the few existing ones, most studies 
have investigated the impact of fiscal policy on asset prices. Alfonso and Sousa (2009) have for 
example  shown  that  fiscal  policy  shocks  play  a  minor  role  in  the  asset  markets  of  the  U.S.  and 
Germany. However, fiscal policy measures substantially increase the volatility of housing and stock 
prices in the U.K and Italy. In the same way, van den Noord (2003) has suggested that the tax systems 
in smaller euro area countries are conducive to volatile house prices and have been interacting with 
generally higher inflation rates. 
     
In the present study we propose to close the gap by modelling French residential investment, taking 
explicitly into account fiscal policy measures (taxes and subsidies alike). We assess the possibility that 
fiscal policy influences residential investment and therefore the business cycle. To that purpose, we 
build a model where residential investment is explained by a number of macroeconomic (permanent 
income, house prices, interest rates) and fiscal variables. This will be done in the framework of a 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a short overview of housing 
taxes and subsidies in France. Section 3 outlines the VECM methodology utilised. Section 4 then 




2.  Overview of fiscal intervention on residential investment in France 
 
This  section  examines  the  evolution  of  residential  investment  and  the  various  types  of  housing 
subsidies and taxes. Data on the different types of subsidies and taxes were provided by the French 
Ministry of Housing. The data on residential investment are taken from national accounts. Our data set 
covers the period from 1984 to 2006 (the availability of fiscal data constrains the sample period). The 
share of residential investment in GDP exhibits a decline from 1984 to 1992, but is relatively stable 
around 4.3% since 1993. Residential investment’s growth rate in real terms, however, displays strong 
cyclical movements inducing the aforementioned instability on the business cycle (Figure 1a). 
 
                                                       
1 In the same way, Bisping and Patron (2008) found that shocks to residential investment have a large impact on US GDP.   4
 
  2.1. Subsidies on residential investment  
 
Residential investment in France is characterised by an important although slightly decreasing degree 
of policy intervention. In 2006, the various subsidies amounted to € 11.2 bn in real terms which is to 
be compared to € 14 bn in 1984. For 2006, this corresponds to 1.5% of residential investment. The 
growth rate of subsidies in real terms displays strong fluctuations in line with residential investment 
developments (Figure 1b). Subsidies on residential investment have decreased over the period under 
review: their share in GDP declined from 0.14% in 1984 to 0.06% in 2006. This evolution covers 
sometimes  opposite  trajectories  for  the  different  sub-categories  of  subsidies,  reflecting  mainly 
legislative  changes  (Figure  2a).  Total  subsidies  can  be  further  subdivided  into  three  categories 
(financial, interest rate and tax subsidies) for which the French Ministry of Housing has provided data 
for (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Amount of subsidies on residential investment in 2006 (bn €) 
  Amount 
Financial subsidies  1.3 
Interest rate subsidies  2.2 
   Of which general loans for households  1.5 
   Of which loans for social housing  0.4 
   Of which “1% housing” framework  0.4 
Tax subsidies  7.7 
Source: French Ministry of Housing 
 
Financial subsidies amounted to € 1.3 bn in 2006 and accounted for approximately 12% of total 
housing subsidies2. This type of subsidies has been relatively stable over time: financial subsidies 
decreased somewhat in line with the decline in subsidies related to the construction of social housing 
around 1995, but increased again when the National Housing Agency extended its activities from 2002 
onwards. 
     
Interest rate subsidies consist in loans at preferential rates. The amount of subsidy is estimated by 
difference between the amount of a loan (capital and interest) contracted at market rate and a credit 
contracted at a preferential rate. This type of subsidy amounted to € 2.2 bn in 2006 and represented 
20% of total investment subsidies. Interest rate subsidies decreased by around 25% over the period, 
mainly due to the decline in market interest rates. Interest rate subsidies can further be divided into 
three categories: 
￿  General loans for households take the form of either i) housing saving plans or ii) the so-called 
"zero rate loan" that were introduced in 1995. i) A housing saving plan is very much a bank 
account on which the household in question has accumulated monetary holdings for at least 4 
and up 10 years. It is the existence of the latter that allows a household to access preferential 
interest rates. ii) The zero rate loan is a supplementary loan for households planning their first 
home purchase, its amount being limited to 20% of total investment. The share of these loans 
in the total of interest rate subsidies has increased from 28% in 1986 to 66% in 2006. 
￿  Loans for social housing. The aim of these loans is to promote the purchase and improvements 
of  social  housing  by  low  income  households.  The  part  of  loans  for  social  housing  has 
decreased from 55% in 1986 to 16% in 2006. 
￿  Loans that are part of the "1% housing" framework. These loans consist in supplementary 
loans for main home purchases, financed by companies’ contributions to a common fund. The 
"1% housing" scheme represents a stable part of 18% in interest rate subsidies. 
 
Tax subsidies amounted to € 7.7 bn or 68% of total subsidies in 2006. This last category of subsidies 
has doubled in real terms over the period, increasing particularly since 1999. These subsidies mainly 
                                                       
2 Financial subsidies have to be understood as actual cash flows between economic agents and the state.   5
concern housing improvements that benefit from a reduced VAT rate (5.5%) and, since 1999, tax 
credits. The remainder of tax subsidies takes the form of income tax reductions ("Perissol", "Robien" 
and "Borlo" plans).  
 
   
  2.2. Taxes on residential investment  
 
In 2006, taxes on residential investment amounted to € 22.7 bn in real terms, correspondong to 3.1% 
of total residential investment. As for subsidies, the growth rate of taxes in real terms displays strong 
fluctuations  in  line  with  residential  investment.  Over  the  period  under  consideration,  taxes  have 
increased as a share of GDP (0.09% in 1984 to 0.13% in 2006, Figure 1c). 
     
Taxes on residential investment can be divided into indirect taxes and property taxes (Figure 2b). Out 
of the two, the main component is property taxes. Their evolution exhibits a linear increasing trend 
since their computation is based on a stable tax base (the cadastral value) and local tax rates. On the 
contrary,  the  evolution  of  indirect  taxes  exhibits  strong  fluctuations  and  their  trajectory  was  in 
particular affected by the 1995 tax cuts and a number of fiscal measures over the 1999-2001 period 




3.  The VECM methodology 
  
Subsidies and taxes (our explanatory variables) are of course linked to the amounts finally spent on 
residential  investment  (the  endogenous  variable).  Therefore,  co-movements  and  endogeneity  may 
occur within the given set of variables. The VECM methodology outlined in the following allows 
dealing with these issues. 
 
 
3.1. The data 
 
Residential investment (INV) is commonly thought to depend on households’ permanent income (Y). 
For our study, we chose to proxy permanent income by households’ consumption in non-durables 
goods and services. According to the theory of permanent income, households consume a constant 
fraction  of  their  permanent  income  at  every  period,  implying  that  a  household's  consumption  is 
proportional to its permanent income. As consumption in durable goods is rather an investment than a 
consumption decision, consumption in non-durables and services seems therefore to be a good proxy 
for permanent income. Since the aim of this study is to analyze the impact of public interventions on 
residential investment, we include subsidies (G) and taxes (T) in the set of explanatory variables. 
     
Note that in our specification interest rates an exogenous. The long term interest rate (IRL) that we use 
for our specification is the 10 year government bond. This variable is clearly not determined by any of 
the series used in our data sample, but rather by monetary and fiscal policy actions and inflationary 
expectations. Using the interest rate as an exogenous variable, allows us therefore to focus on fiscal 
factors,  disregarding  financing  conditions  in  the  standard  specification  of  the  present  analysis.  In 
addition,  the  series  of  government  bonds  has  the  advantage  of  exhibiting  the  same  trajectory  as 
mortgage rates. Indeed, the margin on mortgage rates over government bonds is stable over time and 
small in levels as mortgages are often cross subsidized and used by banks to attract customers while 
banks’ profits are made in other segments of their activity. 
     
Housing  prices  (HP)  correspond  to  the  housing  index  for  existing  dwellings  and  are  also  held 
exogenous as their impact on residential investment is far from clear-cut. As illustrated in Salo (1994), 
housing is an ‘ordinary good' (its demand is negatively related to prices) in markets where credit is not 
restricted. In an economy with binding quantitative restrictions imposed on borrowers, housing is no 
longer necessarily a decreasing function of prices and income and interest rates can have perverse 
effects on the stock of housing (see also Miles, 1994 and Kenny 1999). The impact on prices will   6
hence depend on the financing conditions of the economy. However, this subject is beyond the scope 
of our analysis that concentrates on fiscal measures' impact on the business cycle. 
     
 
The data set encompasses data from 1984 to 2006. National account data on residential investment are 
denominated in chained volumes. The fiscal series are given in current prices; in order to obtain 
volume indices data were deflated by the CPI. This was also done for the price series used. All 
variables are expressed in logarithms and real terms. According to statistical tests, data present neither 
seasonal  patterns  nor  level  shifts,  the  latter  being  important  for  the  subsequent  unit-root  and 
cointegration testing procedure. 
 
 
3.2. Testing procedure 
 
3.2.1.  Unit root analysis 
 
We follow the testing and estimation procedure outlined in Lütkepohl (2004). As mentioned above, 
none of the series used exhibit structural breaks or shifts. It is therefore possible to conduct standard 
unit root tests. We conduct the type of unit root test proposed by Ng and Perron (2001). The Ng-
Perron tests have two advantages in comparison to other unit root tests: their power is enhanced by 
local GLS detrending of the data and the use of modified information criteria leads to substantial size 
improvements. Unit root tests indicate that all series are first order integrated (see appendix 1). In that 
respect, it was particularly important to deflate the fiscal series, since otherwise they were found to 
have two unit roots, as often the case for data defined in current prices. 
 
3.2.2.  Determining the cointegration rank   
 
The model set up takes the following form: a K-dimensional vector of time series xt is a first order 
integrated process generated by a VECM of the following form:  
 
t p t p t t t x x x x e ab + D G + D G + = D + - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 .... '       (1) 
 
εt is a K-dimensional unobservable zero mean white noise process with positive definite covariance 
matrix  ( ) u t tu u E S =
' . xt is a K-dimensional vector of observable variables and α and β are (Kxr) 
matrices of rank r. They specify the long-run part of the model where β contains the cointegration 
matrix, r is the cointegration rank of the process, and α represents the loading coefficients. Thus, ab’x 
can be referred to as the error correction term. The Gi’ (i=1,....,p) are (KxK) short-run parameter 
matrices.   
 
Given the model set-up, it is in practice necessary to determine the number of lags to take into account 
for the cointegration tests. This can either be done by sequential testing procedures or be based on 
model  selection  criteria.  For  this  study  the  lag  order  was  determined  based  on  AIC  criterion 
(Lütkepohl  and  Saikonnen,  1999).  Cointegration  tests  for  the  model  were  conducted  taking  into 
account the so-determined lag order. As the dimension of a system can have an important impact on 
the test results (Gonzalo and Pitarakis, 1999), cointegration tests are also undertaken for all possible 
sub-systems, i.e. pairs of variables3. Johansen’s trace test detects one cointegration relationship for 
residential investment (see appendix 2). The results of the pair wise tests (not reported here) are 





                                                       
3 The consistency check in a system of variables can best be explained by an example: in a system of three first-order integrated 
variables, all pairs of variables are found to be cointegrated. Consequently, there has to be two cointegration relationships in 
the whole system.     7
3.2.3.  Imposing restrictions on the cointegration matrix and loading coefficients  
 
For a given cointegration rank and lag order the VECM can be estimated by a reduced rank regression, 
as  shown  in Johansen  (1991,  1995). To  that purpose,  restrictions  have  to  be imposed  to  identify 
matrices  α  and  β  in  (2).  For  one  cointegration  relation  (r=1)  this  amounts  to  normalising  the 
coefficient of the first variable to one. Note that the normalisation of one or more variables requires 
adequate ordering of the variables in the VECM. In that sense it is particularly useful to know the 
cointegration ranks of all subsystems. Economically, applying restrictions on matrices α and β allows 
us to identify cointegration relations and by that means to replicate economic relations. We chose to 
normalize the coefficient of investment, since it is the dynamics of this variable that we seek to 
explain.       
 
 
3.3. Impulse response functions and variance decomposition 
 
The  relationship  between  variables  might  be  highlighted  by  impulse  response  functions,  these 
functions presenting the reactions of one variable to various shocks. However, due to the presence of 
unit roots (all series are first order integrated) it is not possible to invert the VAR in levels into a MA 
representation (i.e. the Wold representation does not exist). In order to address this issue, Lütkepohl 
and Reimers (1992) suggest an algorithm that allows obtaining impulse responses recursively in a 
cointegrated system.   
 
To  that  end,  the  reduced  form  VECM  is  rewritten  as  a  VAR  representation  in  levels  using  the 
following relations: 
        t e
p
i
p t e p e t e x A x ,
1
, , , e + =∑
=
-         (2) 
where  1 1 ' G + + = K I A ab ,  1 - G - G = i i i A  for i = 2,…, p-1 and p p A G - = . The impulse responses 
are then recursively computed by: 
          ∑
=
- F = F
i
j
j j i i A
1
        (3) 
where  K I = F0 .  
 
Confidence intervals for impulse responses were constructed by bootstrap, since the latter have certain 
advantages over asymptotic confidence intervals. In particular, they were found to be more reliable for 
small  samples  (Lütkepohl,  2004).  The  confidence  intervals  surrounding  the  following  impulse 
response functions were obtained by the standard percentile interval as in Efron and Tibshirani (1993) 
with 2000 replications. 
 
Forecast error variance decompositions are alternative tools for analysing the dynamic interactions 
between  the  variables.  Denoting  by  wkj(h)  the  percentage  contribution  of  variable  j  to  the  h-step 
forecast error variance of variable k it can be shown that: 
    ∑
=
- - + + + + =
K
j









, ) ... ( ) ... ( ) ( q q q q w       (4) 
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4.  Empirical results  
 
 
4.1. Regression results 
 
The tables below report the estimation results for residential investment in France over the 1984-2006 
period. Table 2 presents the results for the cointegration vector for the long-term relationship.  
 
Table 2. Cointegrating vector 
INV  Y  G  T  Constant 








t-stat in brackets 
 
As can be seen, income (Y) is the main driving factor behind residential investment. The coefficient 
on  households’  disposable  income  is  slightly  greater  than  unity,  indicating  that  the  share  of 
households’  investment  in  GDP  is  constant.  More  precisely,  this  result  implies  a  high  long-run 
elasticity that is in line with the idea that a housing service is a superior good whose demand grows 
faster than income. The coefficient on subsidies (G) has the expected positive sign and is statistically 
significant. Results suggest a long-run elasticity of investment with respect to subsidies equal to 0.31. 
Thus, a rise in subsidies increases residential investment in the long run but the multiplier is below the 
unity.  This  result  confirms  the  influence  of  fiscal  policy  on  residential  investment.  No  long-run 
relationship is found between taxes (T) and residential investment as the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. It may seem surprising that only subsidies can influence residential investment in the long 
run.  This  may  be  related  to  the  fact  that  subsidies  are  a  crucial  variable  affecting  households’ 
investment decisions while taxes determine both consumption and investment choice. 
 
Interestingly enough, the pair wise cointegration tests conducted on the subsystems of the variables, 
did not indicate that a cointegration relationship exists between housing taxes and subsidies. This is in 
line with the budgetary principle of non-appropriation which inhibits that specific fiscal revenues are 
earmarked  to  specific  expenditures.  More  precisely,  this  entails  that  subsidies  for  residential 
investment are not financed by the revenues that taxes on residential investment generate. In addition, 
property taxes are levied on local levels of government and the way they are fixed is surrounded by a 
high degree of uncertainty. The tax base on which property taxes are levied on is the cadastral value of 
the property as calculated by the state. This value, although public, is little known by home buyers, 
since it can differ from the actual purchasing price of a housing unity. In addition, the overall tax rate 
is the aggregation of taxes levied at different layers of local governments (city, department, region) 
which fixe their own tax rate each year depending on their financing needs. Therefore, the level and 
the  evolution  of  property  taxes  are  hardly  foreseeable  for  home  buyers  or  builders.  The  little 
information agents have on taxes ex-ante may explain that property taxes are not considered when the 
decision to buy or construct a house is made, and this in turn may explain that they are not significant 
in our estimation. 
 
Table 3 summarises the results for the short-term dynamics. The short-term relationship is satisfactory 
in the sense that the error correction term related to the cointegration vector (ECT) is significant and 
exhibits the expected negative sign. The change in long-term interest rate has a negative impact on the 
growth  rate  of  residential  investment  with  a  lag  of  2  quarters.  This  is  consistent  with  common 
economic theory, since an increase in interest rates involves a bigger debt burden for households, 
weighing on their borrowing capacity and lowering hence the investment’s volume. The coefficient of 
housing prices is not statistically significant. This result might be explained by the fact that house 
prices can have mixed effects on residential investment. If housing is considered as an ‘ordinary good’ 
an increase in prices will dampen investment. If housing is viewed as an investment in the strict sense, 
an increase in prices can augment residential investment. This distinction hinges also on whether one   9
considers that residential investment is undertaken by households or construction firms, the former 
having to comply with costs while the latter can pass them on to consumers (see also Kenny, 1999)4. 
 
Table 3. Elements of short term dynamics 
Variable  DINV  DY  DG  DT 
































R²  0.57  0.61  0.54  0.35 
t-stat in brackets 
 
 
4.2. Impulse response analysis and variance decomposition results 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between variables, impulse responses functions were computed for 
the model. The impulse responses have to be interpreted as the response of residential investment to 
one Cholesky standard deviation in each variable. As expected, the impact of revenue on residential 
investment is positive, even if its effect appears to be relatively weak: 0.8% after 3 years (Figure 3). 
The impact of subsidies is positive as expected and about 1% after 10 years. As already for the 
cointegration analysis, the impact of taxes on residential investment is not significant. 
     
The  variance  decomposition  allows  determining  which  of  the  explanatory  variables  is  the  most 
prominent for the dynamics of residential investment (Figure 4). The main explanatory variable is 
residential investment itself, implying some inertia in the series. This result can hint at the existence of 
autocorrelation which can be expected for a I(1) series. Revenue explains only 6% of investment’s 
variance. On the contrary, the impact of fiscal measures is highly significant: taxes explain up to 13% 
of the variance after 15 quarters. The explicative power of subsidies even increases over the time and 
attains 25%. 
     
Subsequently, fiscal policy has a significant impact on residential investment both in the long and 
short run. Therefore, fiscal variables should be part of the set of explanatory variables, when analysing 
the factors affecting investment. It seems, however, that housing subsidies have more of an impact 




4.3. Specification tests 
     
Specification tests were performed for the baseline and two other specifications (see appendix 3). LM 
tests  conclude  that  residuals  were  not  correlated,  Jarque-Bera  tests  (using  Urzua’s  method  of 
orthogonalization) imply their normality, and the models seem to be robust to various departures from 
the standard linear model assumptions. The ordering of the variables may have an impact on the 
results. This possibility was checked by reversing the ordering of the variables and results show that 




                                                       
4  This  result  is  also  broadly  consistent  with  Girouard  and  Blöndal  (2001),  as  the  authors  find  that  the  nexus  between 
residential investment and the price-cost ratio appears to be weak in France. 
   10
4.4 Alternative specifications 
 
4.4.1. Net subsidies  
 
We  consider  an  alternative  specification  for  residential  investment  using  net  subsidies  (subsidies 
minus taxes) as the only fiscal variable. This second set of results underlines the relative robustness of 
our results (Table 4): long-run elasticities of investment with respect to permanent income and to net 
subsidies (NG) are positive and statistically significant. In addition, short-term dynamics exhibit the 
expected trajectories. The change in long-term interest rate has a negative impact on the growth rate of 
residential investment with a lag of 2 quarters; the change in housing prices is again statistically not 
significant. Finally, impulse responses functions display the same expected paths, as was already the 
case for the benchmark model (Figure 5). 
 
Table 4. VECM results with net subsidies 
 Cointegrating vector 
INV  Y  NG  Constant 








Short term dynamics 
Variable  DINV  DY  DNG 
























R²  0.50  0.34  0.61 
t-stat in brackets 
 
4.4.2. Inclusion of financial factors  
 
Financial factors have been highlighted as one of the major determinants in differences in national 
housing market dynamics. For example, Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) have emphasised how different 
characteristics of mortgage markets regarding loan to value ratios, mortgage rate references, valuation 
methods  or  securitisation  practises  may  affect  the  interactions  between  housing  prices  and  other 
macroeconomic variables (GDP, interest rates, bank credit). 
 
Over the period in consideration, major regulatory changes intervened in the French mortgage market. 
In 1987, the end of administrative control of credit ("encadrement du crédit") triggered a period of fast 
increases in loans and housing prices as banks competed for market shares.  
 
Apart from these important regulatory changes, a series of other factors had an impact on banks' 
pricing  strategies  for  mortgages.  In  the  first place, the  process  of  European Monetary  integration 
contributed to a decline in interest rates, a development of which banks and consumers have benefited 
from in all countries. In addition, banks' pricing and margin behaviour has very much evolved over the 
period in consideration: mortgages credits have become a product that banks use to attract and secure 
loyalty of their clients. Simultaneously, the average duration of new mortgage credits has substantially 
increased  in  France:  from  11.8  years in  average  in  1989,  it increased  to  14.3  years  in  1999 and 
accelerated to 19.2 years in 2008 (Modèle Fanie, Observatoire du crédit immobilier). 
   11
Given the above, we propose to construct an indicator of maximum indebtedness that summarizes the 
impact of the change in financial factors as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. This indicator 
should be understood as the maximum amount of money a household can borrow for the purchase of a 
house given his income, the average duration of mortgages and interest rates for newly contracted 
mortgages. 
 
A household may borrow up to a monthly payment equal to a third of its income. It is thus possible to 
compute a maximum average amount of indebtedness per households (K) as: 
 












        (5) 
 
Where GDI equals gross disposable income in value per household; J is the average mortgage duration 
and r the average interest rate on mortgages. 
  
The results for that specification are presented in Table 5. Permanent income and interest rates have 
been removed from the regressions as borrowing capacity already includes a gross disposable income 
term and takes into account changes in interest rates. The borrowing capacity has the expected positive 
impact on residential investment. The coefficient’s magnitude is particularly important, underlining 
the  important  influence  of  the  above  mentioned  financial  factors  on  investment.  In  addition,  this 
alternative specification does not change the results obtained in former parts of the analysis: subsidies 
continue to be highly significant, while taxes and property prices are not. Impulse reaction functions 
are also consistent with the ones for the benchmark model (Figure 6). 
 
Table 5. VECM results with financial factors  
Cointegrating vector 
INV  K  G  T  Constant 










Elements of short term dynamics 
Variable  DINV  DY  DG  DT 
























R²  0.55  0.45  0.59  0.54 
t-stat in brackets 
 
The obtained results imply that fiscal tools and financial factors have a large impact on residential 
investment. When both of these factors are taken into account, property prices cease to influence 
residential investment. On the one hand, this entails that taxes can obviously distort price signals. On 




4.5. A disaggregated approach  
 
While the previous sections assessed the impact of subsidies and taxes on residential investment as a 
whole, this section attempts to exploit the disaggregated data on the different types of taxes and 
subsidies described in section 2. 
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The  methodological  framework  remains  the  same  (VECM,  income  as  part  of  the  endogenous 
variables,  prices  and  interest  rates  as  exogenous  variables)  while  we  replace  the  aggregate  fiscal 
variable  (subsidies  or  taxes)  by  a  specific  fiscal  variable.  The  fiscal  items  available  of  are  the 
following: financial subsidies, interest rate subsidies, tax subsidies, indirect taxes, and property taxes5. 
The long term specification exhibits the same properties as the originally estimated VECM. Income is 
statistically significant and bears a positive sign; the same is true for all subsidies apart from the 
financial ones (the latter being the smallest item might explain why there impact is statistically not 
significant).  None  of  the  taxes  considered  is  statistically  significant.  These  disaggregated  results 
confirm therefore our first set of estimations. 
     
Concerning the short-term dynamics, the error correction term is always negative and significant, and 
the change of interest rates has a remaining negative impact on investment growth. The change in 
house prices is still not significant. 
     
Figure 7 displays impulse response functions of residential investment for a positive shock of the 
fiscal items mentioned above. The reaction of an increase in subsidies is always positive but the 
magnitude is volatile depending on the fiscal item. The impact of financial subsidies is not significant, 
which might be due to the relatively low amounts these subsidies account for (see section 2). On the 
contrary, tax subsidies appear to be the type of subsidy that has the greatest impact on investment. 
Interest rate subsidies have a significant positive impact and this although they only represent 20% of 
total subsidies. 
     
Concerning  taxes,  indirect  taxes  are  the  only  ones  that  exhibit  the  expected  negative  impact  on 
investment, but their significance level decreases rapidly. The impact of a property tax shock on 
investment  is  somewhat  counterintuitive,  as  it  exhibits  a  positive  sign  which  might  be  related  to 
changes in the tax base that are not correlated to the evolutions of residential investment itself. The 




  4.6. Changes in fiscal activism over time 
 
The structure of public intervention on residential investment in France has strongly changed since the 
1980s and this is especially the case regarding subsidies. These changes could have modified the 
impact each fiscal item has on residential investment. To detect possible changes of fiscal measures’ 
impact over time, we propose a recursive analysis of subsidies on data windows of 11 years (Figures 
8). For each type of subsidy, we estimate the impulse function over [t1, t44]. In the following, we move 
ahead by one period and reestimate over the sample [t1, t45]. This procedure is repeated up to the last 
available data point of the sample [t1, tT]: 
The  impact  of  financial  subsidies  is  relatively  low  over  the  period.  Moreover,  although  the  first 
impulse  on  investment  is  positive,  the  effect  decreases  rapidly.  When  the  1996-1997  period  is 
included,  the  estimated  impact  is  strongly  negative  and  may  reflect  the  impact  of  subsidy  cuts. 
Conversely, the extension of the National Housing Agency’s working domain in 2002 appears to have 
a more persistent positive effect. Interest rate subsidies have a positive impact that is relatively stable 
over the period in consideration. Note that there is a correlation between the increase of the impact and 
the introduction of "zero rate loans" in 1995 (the number beneficiaries was extended in 2005, without 
any effect on the data). Finally, tax subsidies’ impact is always strongly positive, but seems to have 
declined somewhat over the time. The results for the dynamic assessment underline that the positive 
impact subsidies can have on residential investment is also stable over time.  
 
                                                       
5 The number of lags chosen for specifications related to financial subsidies and indirect taxes is smaller (3 lags) than the one 
in the baseline (4 lags), reflecting the fact that these measures are paid out /levied directly. In contrast, the number of lags 
chosen  for  the  specification  related  to  tax  subsidies  is  higher  (6  lags)  as  households  benefit  from  the  latter  only  upon 
reception of their income tax return. 
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Our results would thus imply that by far the most effective policy to influence residential investment is 
one that relies on tax and interest subsidies. Interestingly, the actual measures taken since 2006 seem 
consistent with the results of this study. The deductibility of loan interest rates for instance is a tax 
subsidy that should have a significant effect on housing market dynamics. Similarly, the green ‘zero 
rate loans’ instituted in the 2009 budget should enhance the fiscal stimulus for residential investment 





5.  Conclusion 
 
The present study models French residential investment by means of a VECM that explicitly takes into 
account fiscal variables. Our analysis has shown that fiscal variables (subsidies and taxes) should be 
included  in  the  analysis  of  residential  investment.  Analytically,  a  long  term  relationship  between 
investment  and  subsidies  exists,  making  subsidies  an  adequate  measure  to  influence  residential 
investment and hence the business cycle.  
 
A disaggregated approach for several different fiscal measures confirms that subsides rather than taxes 
should be used in order to effectively impact residential investment. More precisely, tax and interest 
rate subsidies have the most significant positive impact on investment.  
 
When accounting for financial factors by means of households' borrowing capacity, we find that the 
latter  also  influences  residential  investment  positively.  In  addition,  this  alternative  specification 
underlines the robustness of our baseline specification, as it confirms subsidies as the most efficient 
measure to influence investment.  
It is also noteworthy that for none of our specifications residential property prices have a statistically 
significant  impact  on  investment.  This  result  probably  hinges  on  the  dual  character  of  housing 
(investment  versus  consumption  good).  While  this  entails  that  taxes  can  distort  price  signals,  it 
underlines as well the important role fiscal policy can play for the stabilisation of the business cycle. 
 
Measures taken since 2006 seem consistent with the results of this study. The deductibility of loan 
interest is a tax subsidy that should have significant effects on the housing market dynamic. Similarly, 
the ecological zero rate loan instituted in the 2009 Finance law6 and improved in the fiscal stimulus 
should help cushion the ongoing decline in house prices.  
                                                       
6 The green zero rate loan is a credit to finance environmental works in a old home or buying a new property labelised low 
energy consumption.   14
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Fig 1a. Residential investment 
 
 
Fig 1b. Subsidies on residential investment 
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Fig 2a. Evolution of subsidies in real terms (bn €) 
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Fig 3. Impulse response functions 
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Fig 6. Impulse reaction functions of the model with maximum average amount of 
Indebtedness per households 
 







































































































































































































































































































Fig 8a. Recursive impulse reaction function of residential investment 







Fig 8b. Recursive impulse reaction function of residential investment 



























































































































Fig 8c. Recursive impulse reaction function of residential investment 




































































































Appendix 1. Ng-Perron unit root tests 
 
Variable in level 
Variable  Exogeneous  Lag  MZa  MZt  MSP  MPT 
INV  C+T 
5% critical value 








Y  C+T 
5% critical value  








G  C 
5% critical value 








T  C+T 
5% critical value 








HP  C+T 
5% critical value 








IRL  C+T 
5% critical value 









Variable in difference 
Variable  Exogeneous  Lag  MZa  MZt  MSP  MPT 
DINV  C 
5% critical value 








DY  C 
5% critical value  








DG  C 
5% critical value 








DT  C 
5% critical value 








DHP  C+T 
5% critical value 








DIRL  C 
5% critical value 











The  Ng-Perron  test  fails  to  reject  the  null 
hypothesis of a unit root the first difference of 
the permanent income series. However, as can be 
seen  from  figure  below,  there  is  no  reason  to 
believe that the series for permanent income still 
contains a unit root, once it is differentiated. In 
order to confirm that intuition, ADF and Phillips 
Peron unit root tests are additionally conducted. 
The results are presented in table A1. Indeed the 
null hypothesis of a unity root is rejected in both 
cases. Note that for seasonally adjusted series the 
null  hypothesis  of  a  unit  root  is  less  often 
rejected than it should be (Davidson et al., 1992). 
 
 
Fig A1. Permanent income in first difference 
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Appendix 2. Cointegration tests 
 
Series included: INV, Y, G, T 
Lags: 1 to 4 
 






r = 0  0.301  58.831  47.856  31.138  27.584 
r = 1  0.176  27.684  29.797  16.887  21.132 
r = 2  0.072  10.807  15.494  6.471  14.265 
r = 3  0.049  4.335  3.841  4.335  3.841 
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Appendix 3. Robustness tests 
 
Table A2. Residuals tests 
Test  t-stat  p-value 
LM-Type  25.601  0.157 
Jarque-Bera  62.880  0.217 
 
 
Fig A2. Checking of the ordering of the variables 
 
Response of investment to a subsidy shock 
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